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Review
Reviewed Work(s): Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England by Paul R. Hyams
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Source: *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 120, No. 489 (Dec., 2005), pp. 1365-1368
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3491052
Accessed: 20-04-2018 02:27 UTC

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misdeeds and sought a Patriarchal invitation to visit Russia. Dunn is concerned less to understand than to rebuff Orthodox objections.

His conclusion, that Russia should embrace Catholicism in order to be transformed into a 'modern, successful state', I find as astonishing and unsubstantiated as his central thesis. Ironically, he suggests that only an authoritarian government is likely to overcome the historical anti-Catholicism of Russians and ensure that the modernising, westernising influence of Catholicism pervades the nation. As this book will surely confirm Russian Orthodox suspicions that—despite Vatican protestations to the contrary—Catholics aim to 'convert' Russia in flagrant disregard of Orthodox sensibilities, one can only hope that it is not translated into Russian.†

Hastings STELLA ROCK

Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England. By PAUL R. HYAMS (Ithaca/London: Cornell U.P., 2003; pp. xxviii + 344. £24.50).

PAUL R. HYAMS argues that the desire to avenge wrong is not only a constant in Western societies, but 'may indeed even be hardwired into the human psyche' (p. ix). That fact is central to understanding Hyams's detailed and careful analysis of how people set about righting wrongs in England between the eighth and the thirteenth centuries. Hyams here fills a surprising historiographical void on the history of medieval feud, working from the motley sources of 400 years of English history to reconstruct and understand enmity in village, honour, county, and kingdom. The goal is almost always to see the law from the bottom up. Hyams brings his feudists stage centre and asks that we understand feud, its private and legal strategies, from their perspective; he wisely refuses to trace the history of feud from the the perspective of kings making laws to control or end it, laws to which the people must adapt or lose. By starting his analysis from the ground's eye view of the actions and emotions of avengers, Hyams shifts our fundamental understanding of how feud functioned in medieval England.

The book is divided into three parts. Part one lays out the conceptions with which Hyams will engage: feud, enmity, friendship (chapter 1) and emotions (more real than feigned) in clerical and secular models of vengeance (chapter 2). 'Feud', for example, Hyams wants us to see 'not as an institution but as a live process with a positive side'—peacemaking and all of its social consequences (p. xvi). His definition is broad: 'a kind of ideal type for all potentially violent acts rationalized and designed to redress wrong'. Hyams situates himself as a processualist influenced by Pierre Bourdieu (1977) as well as Sally Falk Moore (1978) and other anthropologists. Criticising the older formulations of Edward Evans-Prichard and Max Gluckman, who found the 'Peace in the Feud' among peoples without centralised legal authority, Hyams introduces the idea that feud in England can co-exist with law-making rather than merely fill the void before centralised authorities take the field some time during the high middle ages. Hyams's chosen alternative to the 'Peace in the Feud' is the idea of the 'evolution of co-operation'. Hyams reminds us of Wilde's quip, 'Vengeance is a dish best eaten cold', and adds 'nevertheless, it is not for solitary eating'. Feud is all about the group rather than about the wrong. Hyams next tries to establish

 † doi:10.1093/ehr/cei398

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our ability to get at the real emotions of medieval avengers—to assess the *ira, inimicitia,* and *maltalent* that drove avengers in actual cases and in imaginative literature. His conception of these slippery things comes principally from the work of Lila Abu-Lughod and Catherine Lutz (1990): emotions or sentiments are constructed patterns of feelings and behaviour under constant negotiation, and as such constitute judgments, or, quoting these authors, 'socially contested evaluations of the world' (p. 36). Such emotions lead scholars to medieval views of 'how the world ought to be' (p. 39). The emotions of vengeance, then, rather than the act of vengeance itself, tell us about a society's notions of right and wrong.

Part two, 'Undifferentiated Wrong and Its Redress', provides a chronological commentary on what Hyams calls 'customary vengeance'. Here he travels from the Anglo-Saxon *fæhð*, through the brutal aristocratic hurly-burly of the Anarchy, and on to the Angevin response of assizes and eyres. Historians will find in chapter 3 a minimalist position on the power of the Old English kings, explicitly positioned against the maximalist position found in the works of James Campbell, Patrick Wormald, and others. Hyams juxtaposes evidence for Anglo-Saxon feud with the image of the 'Old English State' and argues that there is no conflict between the existence at the same time of a strong monarchy and a significant feud culture. As Hyams puts it, after describing the legislative acts of preconquest kings, 'all this undeniably royal authority operated within a culture permeated and informed by a resistant notion of direct personal action against perceived wrong' (p. 109). But this resistant notion is thoroughly integrated into royal policy, rather than simply opposed. Taking an enemy to one of the king's courts was often just as good a way of getting even as attacking him with an armed band. The Normans appear not to have fiddled much with what they acquired after Hastings. Instead, it was the Angevin Henry II who initiated the first great legal revolution concerning the righting of wrongs with his assizes of Clarendon and Northampton (ch. 5). Hyams cleverly counterpoises these royal assizes with lay reactions that might be preserved in contemporary romances. Hyams, in one of the many pleasurable insights that fill the book, suggests that the readers and listeners of late twelfth-century romances 'will at first have seen the new public procedure pressed on them as a coward's way to deny men the ancient right to face off their accuser' (p. 163). These procedures in particular allowed lesser folk to 'feed accusations into the system' but protected them from retribution. The social consequences were probably great. Legally, as well. It is to these assizes that Hyams traces the origin of the distinction between crime and tort, which he prefers to see as '"Siamese twins" sharing a single life-support system in the principle of wrong' (p. 172). Both were alternatives to feud, allowing wrongs to be dealt with in differing ways. But these alternatives, defining wrong in such a way as to allow royal intervention, 'initiated a quiet revolution' whose consequences influenced much in English government and society (p. 185).

Part three, 'An Enmity Culture', traces a continuity of feud mentality into the thirteenth century, where vengeance remained a strongly felt need, and social and legal practices were marshalled to restrain or resolve it. Hyams here works hard to return emotions to the bare bones of plea rolls and other records, whose clerks had been trained to carefully efface such extra-legal matters. He is also adept at turning the odd case into the exception that proves the rule; it was only the exceptional need of the Byland monks in the 1180s to explain their

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possession of some Yorkshire land that resulted in the recording of one peace marriage. Many more may have been contracted and their genesis as peace marriages never recorded. Hyams's tracing of the development of common law remedies never strays far from those who used them. Women, for example, brought a high proportion of appeals in the thirteenth century because, he conjectures, women would only incur a monetary amercement if their appeals failed, whereas their men folk would risk life and limb (p. 250). Vengeance was not only normal in the countryside, but also between nobles and their retinues. In chapter 8, Hyams integrates his thesis about vengeance with the history of bastard feudalism and its affinities, a structuring of noble households that originated in the troubled time of King Stephen, and to which Henry II was in part responding. Where we finish is similar to where we began: the desire to right wrongs, or get vengeance for wrongs, is constant. The routes by which this could be accomplished changed between Stephen and the fourteenth century, but the *mentalité* did not.

On the whole, Hyams's thesis is persuasive and both individual arguments as well as the collective wisdom of *Rancor* are an inspiring performance. It is also what Hyams considers a preliminary pass. Yet even as a pioneering work, *Rancor* seems overly conjectural. Too often he introduces a 'working hypothesis' or conjecture (explicitly in need of further study) as a critical component to a larger argument (e.g., pp. 34, 43, 62, 68, 163 n. 31, 164, 170, 246, 261). I would have been comfortable with a few loose ends, but not so many. Other aspects of *Rancor* gave me pause. I wonder about Hyams's situating medieval western emotions 'somewhere along the developmental line toward the emotional world of the modern west'. The word 'development' hides within its orthographic folds a teleological perspective, and the whole linkage implies ancestry, which lowers, rather than raises, our guard when reading the words of past avengers and their victims. Hyams's interpretation of the language of his sources is sometimes overly narrow. Take, for example, the following statement Hyams makes when characterising the linguistic change brought about by 1066: 'For a century or more after the Norman Conquest, no single English word may have existed to denote feud the way Old English *fæhð* once had' (p. 57). *Inimicitia,* the Latin word meaning 'enmity' and in some ways equivalent to *fæhð*, is said, according to Hyams, to mean feud by 'incautious lexicographers' (he cites Niermeyer). *Fæhð,* however, had never meant just feud, but also 'enmity', 'hostility', and 'violence'. Were it not for one poem, *Beowulf, fæhð* would be only one of several terms used to describe modern English 'feud', along with *orlegnið* (in poetry), *feondræden* (in poetry and Ælfric), and perhaps also simple and common words like *anda* and *hatung*. When given the chance to label a feud '*fæhð*' the English often avoided it (e.g., *ASC* 755 or Ælfric's translation of Genesis 3:15). It appears to have had no arguable advantage over words with overlapping semantic fields related to what we call feud. It is likely that a lack of technicality for *fæhð* explains why, after the conquest, Francophone legal translators deployed a number of Latin words to represent the *fæhð* they found in the Old English laws: *inimicitiae*, *factio*, *homicidium*, and *mortis causae*, as well as *faida*, the Latinised form of the Old French for enmity and feud. Since so much of Hyams's argument depends on the introduction of words, their achievement of technicality, and their reflectiveness of their period, it is puzzling why he chooses to use the Latin translation of the *Leis Willelme* as a matter of course,

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rather than the *Leis* itself. Differences between the Anglo-Norman French text and Latin translation in any individual case might be slight, but the awareness that the evidence from the translation is secondary rather than primary creates a ripple effect of worry about conclusions made from it. Lastly, Hyams translates most, but not all, of his quotes into English; the surviving untranslated words, phrases, and sentences in Old English, Latin, and Old French will partly shut out many undergraduates and scholars in other fields who might otherwise engage with Hyams's findings (and the unwary reader might come away from page 162 thinking Magna Carta was written in German!).

I do not mean to undermine the main point of the book with these moments of difference, nor to reduce its provocative purpose. A book that generates few criticisms is often one that attempts little. *Rancor* will accomplish its ends, stimulating new work even as it adjusts our image of both Anglo-Saxon justice and Angevin reforms. *Rancor* has already forced me to begin this adjustment of my own work. Throughout this bold and insightful book, we are guided by a learned, personal, and scrupulously fair scholar, who will not leave out objections to his own ideas (some of his notes read as if written by one of his foes). For a subject so grim at times—with beheadings, castrations, rapes, abductions, murders, and beatings aplenty—Hyams stays focused on the human condition, related and interpreted with both earnest concern and humour (where T.S. Eliot's verse on the importance of naming cats is offered to help us see in proper context the naming of writs!). This is an important book for all scholars who hope to understand the emotions of anger, vengeance, and reconciliation, as well as their social and legal framework in medieval England.†

University of Mary Washington BRUCE O'BRIEN

Crusading and the Crusader States. By ANDREW JOTISCHKY (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2004; pp. 299. Pb. £17.99).

THE phenomenal growth in the scope of crusading historiography over the past generation, to which Dr Jotischky draws attention (p. 2), is clearly in evidence in this book. Designed for students and the intelligent lay reader, it covers not merely the major expeditions to the eastern Mediterranean and the history of the Latin states founded in 1098–1109 as a result of the First Crusade, but also the Muslim reaction to the Latin intrusion, the nature of the society established in the Latin East, and the diversification of crusading. The book passes beyond the collapse of Latin Syria in 1291 and takes as its terminal point the year 1336, which witnessed the last (abortive) bid, by Philip VI of France, to head a large-scale expedition to retrieve the Holy Land; thereafter, the 'recovery' crusade rapidly gave way to efforts to stem the Ottoman advance in the Aegean and the Balkans.

An admirable opening chapter examines three historiographical problems: the definition of a crusade; the motivation of crusaders; and the relationship between the conquerors and their non-Frankish subjects in the East. As Jotischky reminds us, given the trajectory of thinking on the Christian Holy War in the eleventh century—as a response to perceived threats within the

 † doi:10.1093/ehr/cei399

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